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ALPHEUS MASON 
Alpheus Mason died in the Fall of 1989 shortly after his ninetieth 
birthday. An exceptional teacher, he was also a prodigious scholar. 
Best known for his definitive biographies of Brandeis and Stone, he 
published over a dozen other volumes and many articles in political 
science and law journals. 
On his retirement students and colleagues presented him with a 
festschrift, Essays on the American Constitution (1964). On his 
death, a memorial ceremony was held at Princeton, and a special 
panel was also organized by Samuel Krislov and Walter Murphy at 
the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association to 
assess Mason's intellectual contribution. The three papers below 
evaluate different facets of his work. In addition, comments on the 
papers were given by C. Herman Pritchett, Jack Peltason, Harry 
Hirsch and Gordon Baker. 
A.T. MASON AND THE CORWIN-MASON 
TRADITION: SCHOLAR AND TEACHER 
IN THE MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL 
STATE 
Samuel Krislov * 
In the fields of judicial biography and American political 
thought, Alpheus Mason was an original, one who came to the en-
deavor without obvious and direct influence, as is evident from the 
two following articles by Howard and Pohlman. In constitutional 
law, however, he was blessed with a rich intellectual inheritance, for 
he was the chosen successor of Edward Corwin. His contribution 
in this field was to elaborate on the political-legal-historical analysis 
of American constitutional development initially forged by Corwin. 
This was achieved mainly through his casebook in American consti-
tutional law, now in its ninth edition, and especially through its ex-
cellent summaries derived from his undergraduate lectures. His 
occasional essays, and his many lecture series, explored more lim-
ited topics and also updated the Corwin-Mason approach. 
Even more interesting are his efforts to go beyond Corwin. 
More than merely updating trends covered by his mentor, or dis-
secting new controversies, Mason tried to understand the new issues 
of his own time by using constitutional history to understand them. 
Civil rights and civil liberties were addressed by Corwin only occa-
sionally and he did not welcome court intervention for their protec-
tion. The biographer of Brandeis and Stone was much more at 
home in a society built on cultural pluralism than was his mentor. 
Corwin also wrote in an era of court curtailment of national power, 
and was, by and large, an advocate of nationalism and executive 
power. Mason came to be troubled by the erosion of state indepen-
dence and, by instinct, was an advocate of legislative powers. These 
differences were subtle, and only gradually can the change in em-
phasis in Mason's work be detected. To a large extent, Mason had 
to liberate himself from his intellectual training, and the hard-
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headed integrity of the approach Corwin forged made this a difficult 
task that would last a lifetime. 
As anyone who took Mason's seminars knows, the Corwin-
Mason approach is pervasive. It is reflected in the Mason-Beaney-
Stephenson casebook, 1 and, paradoxically perhaps, even more in 
Mason's major work in American political thought, Free Govern-
ment in the Making.2 The approach has been accepted as a domi-
nant and persuasive one. As a graduate student I was puzzled by 
claims of Harvard types for Thomas Reed Powell. Today, no one in 
constitutional history or constitutional law questions Corwin's pre-
eminence. Who now cites-let alone reads-Powell? 
The Corwin-Mason link is as clear intellectually as it was on 
the personal level. Mason told me of his first "seminar:" with 
Corwin, where he and the one other graduate student accompanied 
their teacher out into the field, to exercise a sound mind in a sound 
body. To Mason's embarrassment a hole in his shoe became evi-
dent. When he had to admit that he had no money to replace it, 
Corwin arranged for a loan. That in loco parentis role continued 
throughout their lives, sometimes to Mason's gratification, some-
times less to his liking. 
The key link was intellectual. When Corwin began his career 
as a preceptor for Woodrow Wilson, constitutional law was taught, 
in the words of Charles Beard, as "a combination of logic-chopping 
and the star-spangled manner." It was "low-man" on the totem 
pole of law school teaching, usually assigned willy-nilly to a begin-
ning professor. 
Corwin, and his contemporaries-Beard, Cushman, and 
Haines, to name a few-systematically attempted to define constitu-
tional law as a field of endeavor. Given the times-the early de-
cades of the twentieth century--one of the most fundamental 
questions revolved around the legitimacy and nature of judicial re-
view. Corwin's contribution here was strong but not preeminent. 
The other major subject was the evolution of the role of the 
Supreme Court, and there Corwin was to prove dominant. In par-
ticular, he charted the path of property rights in constitutional law. 
In addition, he pioneered the scholarly study of the powers of the 
presidency, leading to further inquiry into war powers and foreign 
affairs. 
In the later case his most prominent student was Rossiter; in 
the earlier areas it was Mason. In both cases they were not limited 
by their master. 
l. A. MASON, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1954), and subsequent editions. 
2. A. MASON, fREE GOVERNMENT IN THE MAKING (1985) 
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I. CORWIN AND THE RISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Corwin helped clarify the institutional base of judicial review-
e.g., rejecting the privy council as progenitor-and wrote the classic 
piece "The Higher Law Background of Judicial Review." It is an 
erudite work, but suffers from homogenizing quite different ideas 
about abstract justice and legal systems. The essay is elegant, and a 
useful compendium, but lacks historical context and all too often 
accepts intellectual precedence as a causal link. 
Rather more significant was his role as an informed, subtle and 
fair-minded critic of major works in the field. For example, he was 
an early, stern, and on-the-mark critic of the methods of both 
Beard's Economic Interpretation of the Constitution (Corwin 
demonstrated that too many of the founders didn't fit even Beard's 
procrustean bed) and his The Supreme Court and the Constitution 3 
(Corwin showed how Beard unsophisticatedly utilized any state-
ment made by founders on judicial review, as well as including their 
comments on state systems). This shows remarkable prescience as a 
critic and those reviews hold up well today. 
II. THE PATH OF DUE PROCESS AND THE ROAD TO 
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 
Corwin set out to understand the evolution of due process and 
to track the growth of court power. He found that these puzzles 
coalesced; the path to control came in resuscitating the doctrine of 
vested rights through the mechanism of due process. 
The phrase "vested rights" appears several times even in 
Supreme Court decisions. Thus Corwin's explicit claim to coinage 
rests upon the linking of the term "doctrine" and rooting the legal 
equities in constitutional law rather than common law. There re-
main Beardian-Parrington semi-conspiratorial overtones of learned 
lawyers and judges manipulating legal symbols to protect property 
and thwart majorities. This portrait of the "have" party and the 
"have not" masses still haunts American historiography, though 
now in more subtle and finely-grained tones. It is also pervasive in 
Mason's work. 
Corwin did not explicitly root the doctrine of vested rights in 
any social struggle, being content to suggest a Chancellor Kent-
Webster-Story-and-Marshall combine on these issues. It is not a 
satisfying account of underlying attitudes, though a perfectly accu-
rate and acute analysis of doctrine. 
The single most obvious amendment of the conspiracy theory 
3. 5 Hist. Tchr[s] Mag. 65, Feb. 1914; 65 AM. PoL. SCI. REV. 329 (1913). 
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of property protection (whether Corwin held it or not is not neces-
sarily at stake) is our new understanding of the history of the com-
pensation clause. The fifth amendment was sponsored by precisely 
the elements a Beardian would suggest should have rejected it. The 
Federalists opposed it on the grounds the national government 
would not be acquiring much property especially in the light of arti-
cle I, section 8, clause 17 requiring prior cession of such property by 
the States, now written out of the Constitution by the post-Civil 
War Republican Court. 4 Obviously, simple patterns do not account 
for this complex balance. For example, the Federalists did not ar-
gue (as they did on other matters) that the fifth amendment com-
pensation was unnecessary because it could be presumed. 
Such an argument would not have been well-based. As Bruce 
Ackerman points out no case has yet been found, prior to 1789, 
where a court ordered compensation in the absence of statutory au-
thorization.s Clauses on compensation were coming into being, 
emerging in varying clarity, in new state constitutions. Litigation to 
clarify was afoot at that level. But the common law assumed emi-
nent domain was a community prerogative and could be legisla-
tively exercised at will perhaps without reimbursement. The sense 
of fairness might be reflected in an act of compensation, but by the 
legislature exercising community judgment in setting forth or ignor-
ing compensation rather than through any assessment of worth by a 
court. 
This illustrates the difficulties with the concept of a pro-and-
anti-property group or a simple ideological interpretation. The 
Hurst school has already sharply modified that view and has cast 
light on the dynamics of society in private law that suggests by sim-
ple analogy what seems to be the most important emendation of the 
Corwinian approach in constitutional law. A most comprehensive 
form of that analysis is that of Morton Horwitz's The Transforma-
tion of American Law (1977), who is otherwise in method and con-
clusions a strong critic of the Hurst approach.6 
Essentially Horwitz argues that the common law of property in 
England concealed obvious contradictions, hidden behind static 
ownership and static usage. "Absolute ownership" was extolled but 
4. See Kohl v. U.S., 91 U.S. 367 (1875). 
5. B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CoNSTITUTION 7-8, 19 n.ll, 193 
n.l3 ( 1977). 
6. A fine example of the Horwitz-Hurst point on differences between England and the 
U.S. is found in a footnote in 2M. HOWE, HOLMES 188 n.IO (1963), citing T. BEVEN, PRIN· 
CIPLES OF THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE (2d ed. 1895) which critically assesses U.S. and English 
cases and the rule of American courts by which "the quiet citizen must keep out of the way of 
the exuberantly active one." 
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usage that affected property of others was simultaneously forbidden. 
The law did not truly control such questions as changing land use 
from, e.g., farming to rental property, because such change was 
rare, gradual, imperceptible, and accordingly rarely contested. 
Even with respect to use of water rights where up-stream changes 
had clear down-stream consequences, common law came to assert 
contradictory doctrine which judges manipulated to achieve accept-
able results. In a sense, eminent domain symbolized this static own-
ership for it emphasized normal untrammelled possession; public 
good necessitated action infrequently enough that a fair compensa-
tion could be adjudged by the Parliament. 
Colonial America could also operate on this common law fic-
tional system, not so much because of static land use, but because of 
abundance and easy availability of resources. But both in the 
mother country and the new country these contradictions were cre-
ating legal conflicts as the turn of the century occurred. New utili-
tarian concepts also began to replace these and other individual 
rights notions (cause and effect is hard to disentangle in Horwitz). 
The expectation that property would be used to advance social pur-
poses resulted in new attitudes and important new doctrine. Ac-
cording to Horwitz, by making subtle doctrinal choices on land use, 
eminent domain, and contract, courts reformulated legal relation-
ships to benefit entrepreneurs financially without the use of tax 
funds, and therefore without adequate social controls. Horwitz 
rounds up the usual suspects-Chase, Kent, Story, Lemuel Shaw-
but finds them guilty of a different crime. We need not concern 
ourselves overmuch with the accuracy of his perception of social 
policy implications or his loose attributions of dark motives, but 
only need note the convincing nature of his argument that this pe-
riod represents a clash of views as to property, its justification and 
its social purpose. 
This gives coherence to Corwin's constitutional account, since 
much the same issues began to plague constitutional law as per-
plexed private law. When roads are paved or even new toll roads 
are authorized, property rights are affected not only with respect to 
roads and bridges but also with respect to inns and hotels or 
merchants on older streets or crossings. Canals affect wharves and 
may flood basements of houses. "Takings" become both more am-
biguous and more ubiquitous. 
Having failed to embed property protection in the ex post facto 
clause, and uncomfortable with the contract clause, the judges lis-
tened with sympathy to Webster trying to use the fifth amendment 
in creative ways. His language creeps into several pre-Civil War 
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decisions, but a new potential was created by the fourteenth 
amendment. 
Originally "due process" was a stylistic flourish, a more ele-
gant substitute for the less pretentious "according to the law of the 
land." It was a major but mild standard requiring only that forms 
of law be established before pains or penalties be assessed. It placed 
no restrictions on what those forms should be other than that "no 
freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or deprived of his freehold or 
liberties ... except by a legal judgement of his peers or by the law of 
the land." 
The essence of Corwin's contribution was to establish that the 
American usage of "due process" has been strikingly different from 
this highly restricted English usage of "law of the land." The lan-
guage was pregnant and bore legal fruit. "Due process" as proce-
dure evolved into "due process" as a standard of substance. 
Corwin provided a driving, crisp, and bare-bones history rather 
than a detailed account or even loose speculation. 1 He adumbrated 
four transformative elements. Corwin's four elements include the 
(1) perceptive instincts of Daniel Webster who as early as the 
Dartmouth College case articulated a desire for a law "which hears 
before it condemns," and analogized breaches of the contract 
clause, bills of attainder, and other acts of arbitrary oppression to 
denials of due process; (2) popular usage of the term in the slavery 
debate, which he acknowledges mainly in the form of the Fremont 
campaign platform; (3) Taney's and Curtis's invocation of due pro-
cess in Dred Scotts and Mu"ay's Lessee v. Hoboken;9 (4) legal dis-
cussion of efforts at prohibition. particularly in the great case of 
Wynehamer v. The People. 10 
John Roche has suggested that the distinction between "proce-
dure" and "substance" is a "scholar's conceit."ll He suggests that 
Corwin imposed as much as found the distinction, and certainly no 
Supreme Court decision makes, recognizes, accepts, or distinguishes 
the essence of Corwin's persuasive terminology. In the end, how-
ever, Roche's argument is a characterization rather than a quarrel. 
He argues that the transformation was a seamless web and the "his-
tory" somewhat artificial. It may with mirror-image faithfulness be 
characterized as a "scholar's quibble." It does add perspective. 
7. See especially, E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GoVERNMENT (1948). 
8. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
9. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855). 
10. 13 N.Y. 426 (1856). 
11. Roche, American Liberty: An Examination of the "Tradition of Freedom" in As-
PECTS OF LIBERTY 148 (M. Konitz & C. Rossiter eds. 1958). See also Eberle Procedural Due 
Process: The Original Understanding 4 CONST. CoMM. 339 (1987). 
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Roche certainly is right that "procedural" protection by judges 
almost inevitably involves some "substantive" control as well. The 
English Courts have in the past few decades reversed themselves on 
review of administrative decisions. They have employed principles 
of "natural justice" -i.e., a mild form of due process-to accom-
plish this. The result is that some gross behavior of agencies has 
been checked to the approval of both the left and the right in British 
politics. 
I have recently given a paper subtitled "What Have We 
Learned Since Corwin?" and will briefly summarize.12 (1) Corwin 
inadequately understood the economic conflict of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth century. The issue was between a static concept of 
property and its use and a dynamic concept of property-in-use to be 
exploited for social purposes. This Hurstian analysis is best found 
in a work by one otherwise distant from that approach, Morton 
Horwitz. (2) Corwin was ahead of his time in attributing to the 
anti-slavery debate an important place in transforming due process, 
but it required modern scholars to put both emphasis and meaning 
to it. (3) Corwin believed he had found the "missing link" between 
procedural and substantive due process in Wyenhamer v. New York. 
Few scholars take that attribution at face value. 
III. THE INTANGIBLES OF CORWIN'S APPROACH 
Corwin combined awareness of political history with legal acu-
ity to alter our understanding of cases. Thus his "Schechter Case-
Landmark, or What?"IJ highlights the intellectual continuity be-
tween that case and E. C. Knight, but shows persuasively its un-
workability, rejecting it as a landmark and establishing it as a 
"what." Similarly, his Commerce Power Versus States Rights 
(1936), his memo for the Department of Justice's Carter Coal argu-
ment, is (like much of the department's work in that time) strongly 
legal and subtly rooted in social reality and evidence. 
IV. MASON AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Mason had to find his own voice. His work on labor in the 
Taft Court was solid enough but not specifically Corwinian. His 
writing on Brandeis attracted the Justice, who set him in competi-
tion with Alfred Lief, a Frankfurter protege and the happy-hot-dog 
candidate for Brandeis's official biographer. (As the history of the 
Holmes Devise volumes, and the Holmes and Frankfurter biogra-
12. Liberty Fund Conference, Nov. 1989. To be published in Pusuus (forthcoming). 
13. Corwin, Schechter Case-Landmark, or What?, 13 N.Y. U. L. REV. !51 (1936). 
36 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 8:29 
phies demonstrate, Frankfurter's judgment about potential biogra-
phers and historians could hardly have been worse.) 
Professor Howard's essay assays Mason on biography, and no 
one can speak to that topic with more authority. Suffice it to say 
that Mason himself did not see Brandeis: A Free Man's Life (1946) 
as primarily a contribution to the study of constitutional law. 
"Brandeis' greatness was pre-court," he suggested to me so many 
times that I'm not sure he wasn't trying to convince himself. Bran-
deis has withstood the onslaught of two score of volumes attempt-
ing to supplant it as the standard volume.'4 This is surprising since 
so much new has become available since its writing. In any event, it 
is vulnerable and I am aware of at least one more major effort un-
derway to supplant it. 
But if the Brandeis book is targeted at the Justice's off-court 
contribution, the Stone volume's is clearly a monumental contribu-
tion to both constitutional law and the study of the judicial process. 
Stone's indiscretions become windows into the process of opinion 
gestation. No one who has read the Stone volume with attention 
would find the merely vulgar renditions of petty gossip in The 
Brethren 16 revealing except as to the doubtful nature of its specifics. 
(Indeed, the fact that Stone is clearly based upon one Justice's per-
spective makes even its gossip more useful that The Brethren's use 
of an omniscient third-person narrator.) And Mason's Stone pro-
vides the backdrop for an important quasi-theoretical volume 
(which is described by its own author in one of his many guises as a 
"vulgar work"), The Elements of Judicial Strategy (1964). With 
Stone joining Beveridge's Marshall and work such as that of Mur-
phy and Howard, we can cumulate and deal with such subtleties as 
Preble Stolz'sl7 taking advantage of the lifting of the veil in Califor-
nia to contrast a different style of court operation and its effect on 
emerging decisions. 
All of this suggests Mason's willingness to depart from 
Corwin's style of doctrine-history, and to amplify his (and their) 
understanding of the political underpinnings of decision. Thus his 
Gaspar Bacon lectures, written in the white-heat of the Stone vol-
ume, are revealingly entitled The Supreme Court: Vehicle of Re-
vealed Truth or Power Group? (1953). In truth he accepted neither 
extreme designation though if he had to choose one or the other I 
have no doubt it would be the latter. But his works are in fact a 
14. Kris1ov, Reappraising Brandeis, 4 CoNST. CoMM. 319 (1987). 
15. A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PiLLAR OF THE LAW (1956). 
16. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979). 
17. P. STOLZ, JUDGING JUDGES (1981). 
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defense of a mild activism, urged as a necessary by-product of 
choice so long as judicial review prevailed. He sided with Black and 
Douglas where Corwin all his life emphasized Thayer and a "Mar-
shallian" limited review. Of course the issues and times were differ-
ent, but there is a contrast and an incongruity in their basic 
constitutional stance. 
Both continuity and disjunction are apparent in the field of 
civil liberties. Corwin found the Warren Court decisions "weird" 
"vicious nonsense," and thought Brown v. Board of Education went 
too far. Indeed, proliferation of rights was not to his liking. He was 
in part trying to overcome his distaste for extreme property claims 
that he makes evident in Liberty Against Government. But his aver-
sion to any national definition of liberty is clear, and it comes to the 
fore in "The Supreme Court as National School."Is 
Perhaps under the influence of Corwin and another 
Princetonian, Arthur Krock, Mason, a product of the Southern cul-
ture of Maryland, at first was gingerly about the desegregation deci-
sion but quickly became a firm defender. He had no such hesitation 
about first amendment rights and-somewhat quaintly-remained 
an advocate of the preferred freedom formula long after it had been 
put on a back burner by the Court. 
Mason highlighted Stone's Carolene Products footnote and 
helped make it perhaps the most powerful constitutional doctrine of 
our time. Unable to reconcile Stone's rejection of "preferred free-
doms" with the footnote, he continued to write and lecture as if 
they were the same notions. 
Privately, he attributed Frankfurter's rejection of special pro-
tection as pettifoggery born out of petty jealousy. He took special 
pleasure in publishing Frankfurter's memos which seemed to sup-
port such protection, but also published materials in which the Jus-
tice maintained he was arguing against a difference in 
jurisprudence, not against a need for special valuation of political 
expression. This was one of the topics he pressed in interviews with 
Frankfurter which he sought while writing the Stone book, inter-
views in which he felt both he and his subject were persistently 
demeaned. He took them on because, he told me, he "always 
learned something" from listening to the Justice. 
Yet Mason, whose discussion of Brandeis's role in forging the 
modern jurisprudence of liberty in his biographies had been, at best, 
skimpy, never went back to retrace that Justice's contribution.I9 
18. Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3 
(1949). 
19. In his comments at our panel, Professor Harry Hirsch informed us that Mason had 
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Neither did he re-evaluate Holmes's efforts, and while he was as 
positive about Hughes's commerce clause decisions as Associate 
Justice as he was condemnatory of his work in that area as Chief 
Justice, he never gave Hughes his due in Bill of Rights decisions. 
One can contrast the relative paucity of coverage of rights and 
liberty cases in Mason and Stephenson (nee Mason and Beaney) 
compared to any modem casebook, whether undergraduate or law 
school. Further vindicating my "growing from Corwin" thesis is 
the fact that each edition saw expansion of the liberties coverage. 
One intellectual puzzle absorbed Mason much more than it did 
Corwin. While the latter saw separation of powers as the arena of 
constitutional sparring of the future, Mason was more concerned 
with Federalism. Corwin found the enemy in "dual Federalism," a 
term he had coined. Later, Corwin joined the chorus bemoaning 
the end of all Federalism. The prevailing scholars of the day were, 
like Harold Laski, convinced that operative Federalism was dead, 
and believed with Leonard White that the constitutional issue was 
closed and re-opening foreclosed; Federalism could no more be re-
vived than one could restore dead leaves to a dead tree. 
Mason's "The Nature of our Federal Union Reconsidered"2o is 
a strong nationalist statement, but emphasizes more complex roots. 
Criticism and hope for the future might be found in the states rights 
debates. Some of the most complex thinking of his biographees-
Brandeis and Stone-was found in this domain. Mason was sympa-
thetic but found no basis in their views-unlike Richard Good-
win-for a new Federalist theory. He was therefore drawn to 
Black's "leave it to Congress" approach because it also entailed 
"leave the states alone." 
More visibly than Corwin, Mason was highly influenced by the 
Progressive view of a "good guys- bad guys" division in American 
politics. He espoused a more sublimated form: interests versus 
numbers. But the "interests" were identified in limited categories-
slaveowners, banking capitalists, lawyers-while "numbers" were 
Frank Capra's "John Doe" incarnate. 
Second only to his biographical works was the influence exer-
privately indicated he believed Brandeis supported a "preferred freedoms" approach. Pur-
posefully reading BRANDEIS to that end, Hirsch had found hints of Mason's convictions on 
this matter. While that fits my own impression, both of Brandeis's and Mason's interpreta· 
tion, he really was tentative on this point. Most vividly I recall his telling me (in discussing 
Hand's somewhat off-key eulogy of Stone) of being with Brandeis and a daughter right after 
the Gobitis decision. The Justice listened to his daughter excoriating the decision, but dis-
creetly kept his own thoughts to himself. That, Mason said, was Brandeis' normal de-
meanor-to reveal little. 
20. Mason, The Nature of our Federal Union Reconsidered, 65 PoL. SCI. Q. 65 (1950). 
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cised on the field of constitutional law by the appearance of his 
casebook. The magisterial chapter introductions-later published 
as a separate volume--gave integration, history and depth to the 
cases. The attempt to modify the case method-to get away from 
pure Socratic teaching for undergraduates-was a major departure. 
(In this as well as Free Government in the Making Mason, a phe-
nomenal teacher, demonstrated his understanding of students and 
their needs.) The initial chapter giving the court structure and basic 
jurisdiction and modes of action, though anticipated by Fairman's2I 
fine little casebook (and probably Beaney's major contribution to 
the book) was also innovative and changed undergraduate teaching 
for the better, alerting liberal arts students to the potency of such 
jurisdictional questions. 
Above all else Mason provided historico-political sophistica-
tion as a prelude to reading the cases. He found, for example, 
Victor Rosenblum's Law as a Political Instrument (1955) obvious, 
and I believe any student in the Corwin-Mason tradition would. 
But he somehow got stuck between that work and Jack Peltason's 
Federal Courts in the Political Process (1955) which he never quite 
accepted. Rosenblum documented political forces playing a role in 
formulation of key constitutional decisions. But Peltason argued 
that systematic study of such forces should be the focus of political 
science concerns, leaving doctrinal and procedural elaboration pri-
marily to legal scholars. Furthermore, he adopted a view of polit-
ical process suggesting such behavior was not aberrational, but the 
source oflegal regularity, as argued by A.F. Bentley and Karl Llew-
ellyn. Mason had no trouble appreciating such theories as Clem 
Vose's interest group analysis22 in the concrete, but feared the socio-
logical approach in the abstract. 
To most of his students it seemed a tiny step but Mason could 
not take it and was harsh with many who did. Actually, Pritchett 
seems to have been the only one of his generation who made the 
transition. (But I have often thought Pritchett got so far out on the 
limb in his first effort that he spent much of the rest of his writing in 
the area trying to scramble back to conventionality, though aware 
he should never cut off the branch his preeminence was based on.)23 
In any event Mason never showed appreciation for the insights of 
judicial process scholarship though his personal relationship with 
21. C. FAIRMAN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS (1948). 
22. C. VOSE, CAUCASIANS ONLY (1959). 
23. Compare, C. PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT {1948) with, e.g., C. PRITCH· 
ETT, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT (1954). 
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many of those scholars were usually cordial and many-like my-
self-would have ascribed their concerns to his influence. 
Mason was and remains a major scholar and he was an excep-
tional teacher. Oddly, I have never heard him lecture, but he was 
quite simply the very best seminar conductor-! use the terms with 
all deliberate enthusiasm-that I have ever seen. Watching him 
chair panels at conventions in the same probing, eliciting, non-ob-
trusive but decisive way over the years confirmed that judgement, 
so that it is not merely the innocent memory of a graduate student 
romanticizing his mentor, but a long-time professional judgement. 
The Stone volume is in my judgement the best single work ever 
on the Supreme Court. The raw material, the diamond in the 
rough, was Stone's; but like a diamond the final product is that of 
the craftsman. One false move and it becomes glass and powder, 
but the flawless rendering of its beauty sets it before us for all to see. 
He rejected the claim he was an unusual teacher, stating he 
was merely lucky to have fine students. As with his modesty over 
the Stone book there is a core of truth about the quality of his stu-
dents though of course his teaching reputation was a magnet that 
drew them. But above all else Mason could extract their best from 
average as well as excellent students. He taught in part, as any 
good teacher, by example, by the sheer exhausting intensity he 
brought to the classroom and the absolute dedication to scholarship 
and learning. 
He contributed as a scholar by the example of taking his work 
seriously and wrestling with himself so as not to take himself seri-
ously. He worked harder than anyone I knew. His output was pro-
digious, he knew his intellectual roots, but he tried to transcend 
them at the same time he honored them. He sought new forms for 
appropriateness, not novelty, and never sought to be chic. Those 
traits further enhance his prodigious scholarly achievements. 
